Showing posts with label Mortgage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mortgage. Show all posts

Sunday, February 10, 2008

Another Asian Crisis Brewing?

Japan is the next sub-prime flashpoint

There is still $300bn of bad debt out there, and Japan could be hiding most of it. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard reports

Just as battered investors had begun to glimpse signs of recovery in America, the next shoe has dropped with an almighty thud in Japan. Echoes are rumbling across the Far East.

The Tokyo bourse has crumbled, suffering the worst start to the year since the Second World War. The Nikkei index is down 17 per cent since Christmas, and the shares of Japanese banks are leading the slide. Mizuho Financial, Mitsubishi UFJ and Sumitomo Mitsui have all been punished as hard or even harder than those US banks at the epicentre of the sub-prime debacle.

The nagging fear is that Japan's lenders - the conduit for the world's greatest stash of savings - have taken on a far bigger chunk of mortgage securities, collateralised loans obligations and other exotica from America's structured credit boom than they have yet revealed.

Americans and Europeans have so far confessed to $130bn of the estimated $400bn to $500bn of wealth that has vanished into the sub-prime hole. Somebody, somewhere, must be sitting on a vast nexus of undisclosed losses. We may find out soon enough whether the hold-outs are in Japan. The banks have to come clean under the country's strict new audit codes by the end of the tax year in March.

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Friday, February 8, 2008

Moral Obligations Of Walking Away

Walking away is certainly a hot topic. I brought up the issue of walking away on October 2nd 2007 in Mortgage Forgiveness Act - The Seen and Unseen.

The winner in the debt forgiveness provision (if there is a winner) is the struggling homeowner. The unseen loser is the mortgage holder, the NAR and the NAHB. Prior to this legislation a homeowner had to worry about tax liabilities of just handing over the keys and walking away. If debt was forgiven prior to bankruptcy, there was also a tax liability. Such considerations have been removed. At the margin, more people will be tempted than before to hand over the keys and walk away.


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Wednesday, February 6, 2008

The Real Scandal

HOW THE FEDS INVITED THE MORTGAGE MESS



PERHAPS the greatest scandal of the mort gage crisis is that it is a direct result of an intentional loosening of underwriting standards - done in the name of ending discrimination, despite warnings that it could lead to wide-scale defaults.

At the crisis' core are loans that were made with virtually nonexistent underwriting standards - no verification of income or assets; little consideration of the applicant's ability to make payments; no down payment.

Most people instinctively understand that such loans are likely to be unsound. But how did the heavily-regulated banking industry end up able to engage in such foolishness?

From the current hand-wringing, you'd think that the banks came up with the idea of looser underwriting standards on their own, with regulators just asleep on the job. In fact, it was the regulators who relaxed these standards - at the behest of community groups and "progressive" political forces.

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Tuesday, February 5, 2008

Pushing on a String?

WHAT THE FED GIVETH, the banks taketh away.

Just days after the U.S. central bank completed its unprecedented 125-basis point easing in its key policy rates, its quarterly survey of bank lending officers showed they had become much more stringent in their extension of credit.

That's key because people and businesses don't borrow from the Federal Reserve, so how much credit the central bank provides, and at what price, affects the private economy only indirectly. It takes a banker or other lender to make that loan to pay for a house or a piece of capital equipment. Indeed, the Fed acknowledged as much when it slashed rates last week, noting that financial conditions had tightenened.

Even as the Fed has made the raw material for those loans cheaper, bank lending officers indicate a far warier attitude toward making new loans, especially -- surprise! -- "nontraditional mortgages." Some 85% of loan officers responding to the quarterly survey they tightened lending standards for this category, which includes subprime.

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FMM Comment: My post yesterday, The Big Credit Squeeze, also refers

Monday, February 4, 2008

The Big Credit Squeeze

WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) - Banks are putting a stranglehold on credit, the Federal Reserve reported Monday.

Banks are raising their credit standards for mortgages, consumer loans and commercial real estate loans at a pace never seen in the 17-year history of the Fed's quarterly survey of senior bank loan officers, the Fed said.

Plain-vanilla business loans were also much harder to obtain, the Fed said.

Banks expect more delinquencies and charge offs for most types of loans to consumers and businesses, the survey said. Banks said they were tightening their lending standards in response to weaker economy, reduced tolerance of risk, and decreased liquidity in secondary markets.

The survey backs up the Federal Open Market Committee's comments last week that credit conditions had tightened considerably, a factor that led to the FOMC to slash interest rates by an unprecedented 125 basis points in two weeks.

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FMM Comment: Three things are happening here.

  1. Banks are hoarding cash because Bank Reserves Go Negative
  2. People can't or don't want to borrow
  3. Banks can't or don't want to lend

Something the Fed can NOT do is force people to borrow. It can only sweeten the deal with low rates. So, if you are struggling to either inhale or exhale, you are suffocating, like the credit markets are doing now. It is just a matter of time, unless some "miracle" happens, before the credit market will turn blue in the face and collapse. And that, is called Deflation.

Thursday, January 31, 2008

U.S. mortgage rates reverse course and rise

CHICAGO (MarketWatch) -- Mortgage rates rose this week, ending about a month-long streak of declines, according to Freddie Mac's weekly survey released Thursday.

"The movement in fixed mortgage rates was broadly consistent with the movements of Treasury bonds over the week," said Frank Nothaft, Freddie Mac chief economist, in a news release. The 30- and 15-year fixed-rate mortgages rose by about 0.2 percentage points, he said, erasing the previous week's decline.

The 30-year fixed-rate mortgage averaged 5.68% during the week ending Jan. 31, up from last week's 5.48%. The mortgage averaged 6.34% a year ago. The 15-year fixed-rate mortgage averaged 5.17%, up from 4.95%. The mortgage averaged 6.06% a year ago.

Five-year Treasury-indexed hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages averaged 5.32%, up from last week's 5.13%. The ARM averaged 6.04% a year ago. And 1-year Treasury -indexed ARMs averaged 5.05%, up from 4.99%. The ARM averaged 5.54% a year ago.

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Monday, January 28, 2008

Countrywide Financial Corporation and the Failure of Mortgage Socialism



Angelo Mozilo is the Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer of the failed Countrywide Financial Corporation. Mr. Mozilo co-founded this company, nearly 40 years ago, in 1969. To be in business for almost forty years, and to become America’s top private home-mortgage lender, are testimonies to genuine business acumen. However, success can breed arrogance, and a sense of supreme power, to the point where a corporate chieftain believes his personal will can override the free market and reshape society according to a grand vision – which, for Angelo Mozilo, entailed making America a better country by bringing home ownership within reach of all and sundry. For Countrywide Financial, unfortunately, Mr. Mozilo’s dream of social engineering demanded that sound credit-underwriting principles be abandoned. And now, Countrywide Financial Corporation’s failure stands as a monument as to how integrating egalitarianism and political correctness, into a business plan, is downright poisonous.

February 4, 2003 marks the day when Countrywide Financial’s shareholders should have dumped every last share of their stock. For on this day Angelo Mozilo made a presentation, at The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, titled The American Dream of Homeownership: From Cliché to Mission. This is the day that Mr. Mozilo revealed to the world that political correctness had infected his mind. He openly declared that sound credit underwriting was tantamount to judgmentalism and, therefore, anti-egalitarian. How dare anyone judge anyone else – credit standards be damned. Subprime mortgages, accordingly, were going to be a blessing for America since everyone deserves a house. Oh how political correctness feels so good. He worshiped the mortgage socialism hatched in the New Deal along with every federal-housing program introduced in the succeeding decades. A true credit professional would have been horrified by this speech; which indubitably was met with approving applause by the pseudo-intellectual, limousine liberals populating Harvard University. February 4, 2003 is the day Countrywide Financial’s Board of Directors should have fired Mr. Mozilo.

Over the years, Angelo Mozilo has been handsomely rewarded by Uncle Sam’s mortgage socialism. Here’s how it works. Countrywide Financial makes a conforming home loan, sells it to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (both are government sponsored enterprises), and has its coffers replenished in doing so; hence, allowing Countrywide to keep churning out loans. Countrywide, in turn, remains the mortgage servicer on each loan and earns a fee for doing so. These fees most certainly add up when you are servicing $1.5 trillion in home loans (not all of which are Fannie and Freddie loans). Needless to say, Countrywide had other sources of revenues but mortgage servicing was top-shelf when it came to profitability.

Thus, it is no wonder why Mr. Mozilo waxed fondly, in his Harvard speech, regarding America’s foray into mortgage socialism. After all, it made him very wealthy. Here is an excerpt:

Our Nation took another important step in 1938 – in fact, 65 years ago this week – when Fannie Mae was created to buy those FHA loans, and as a result, the secondary mortgage market was born. We took a few more giant steps in the 1940s with the G.I. Bill in 1944 and the Housing Act of 1949, which stated the goal of "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family." We witnessed the Fair Housing Act in the 60s, the creation of Freddie Mac in 1970, the expansion of Fannie Mae’s activities, the Community Reinvestment Act in the 70s, the introduction of adjustable-rate mortgages in the 80s, and more recently, the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990.

We have traveled so far – thanks to a mortgage-finance system that remains the envy of the world; thanks to a constant stream of creative and innovative mortgage products, and efforts directed at encouraging the offering of loans to those who have been previously shut out; and simply put, thanks to housing being an enduring public policy objective and the lasting commitment to that objective symbolized by our partnership.

We have transformed from a Nation of renters to a Nation of homeowners. The overall U.S. homeownership rate, which was at 44 percent in 1940, hit 68 percent by the end of the third quarter of 2002.

One can only imagine Mr. Mozilo’s broad smile as he delivered these words. Between his compensation and stock sales, Angelo has made hundreds of millions of dollars. Socialism certainly can be beneficial for an elite few.

Do you remember President George W. Bush’s initiatives to increase homeownership in the United States? His administration definitely played a role in creating America’s housing bubble. When speaking about housing assistance, President Bush evoked the emotion of envy and declared that the U.S. had a "homeownership gap." Angelo Mozilo, being a kingpin of political correctness, couldn’t resist playing the envy-card to an approving Harvard audience. He stated:

It started with the New Deal, and now, we’re in a new century. But through it all, one thing has remained, more or less, constant. This constant is our challenge. And this challenge is to increase the access to affordable housing. And in order to do this, we must close the homeownership gap that still exists.

As President Bush said last October:

"Two thirds of all Americans own their homes, yet we have a problem here in America because fewer than half of the Hispanics and half of the African Americans own their home. That’s a homeownership gap. It’s a gap that we’ve got to work together to close for the good of our Country, for the sake of a more hopeful future. We’ve got to work to knock down the barriers..."

While the number of minority homeowners has advanced recently, climbing from 9.5 million in 1994 to 13.3 million in 2001 – an increase of 40 percent – the fact remains that it is still not at a level equal to that of white homeownership. And as President Bush pointed out, the homeownership rate for African Americans is 47 percent and for Hispanic Americans it is 48 percent, a stark contrast to the homeownership rate of 75 percent for white American households. That means there is currently a homeownership gap of over 25 points when comparing white households with African Americans and Hispanics. My friends, that gap is obviously far too wide. It has been far too wide for far too long. And when adding new factors into the equation – like an influx of new immigrants or continued reduction in the supply of affordable housing – it has the potential to become far worse.

Credit underwriting has nothing to do with race, creed, skin color, gender, or religion. Sound credit underwriting has everything to do with the "Five Cs" of credit – i.e., character, capacity, capital, collateral, and conditions. Under pure capitalism, a credit underwriter is not concerned about making people happy by lending money regardless of a person’s creditworthiness. An underwriter’s primary objective is to make profitable loans and this demands nothing less than effectively assessing risk on a case-by-case basis. This, undeniably, requires underwriters to exercise learned judgment. Ah, but to say this in the cradle of political correctness (Harvard) would have been met with resounding "boos."

To be sure, Mr. Mozilo did not disappoint his fellow limousine liberals. He goes on the attack and smears credit underwriters as being judgmental – the antithesis of political correctness. Considering that Countrywide had become the largest private mortgage lender in the U.S., the following words depict a man who had taken leave of his senses:

I have two issues with our industry’s current underwriting methodology. The first is that the automated underwriting systems kick far too many applicants down to the manual underwriting process, thereby implying these borrowers are not creditworthy; and the second issue is that once arriving in the hands of a manual underwriter, the applicant is subject to basic human judgment that can be influenced by the level of a borrower’s credit score.

Let’s address my first issue. I acknowledge that credit scoring uses proven statistical methods to provide lenders with the ability to quantify the risk of extending credit. And there is little question that the technique effectively and efficiently separates those with very good credit from those with questionable credit.

However, far too many borrowers are being referred to an arduous manual and cumbersome underwriting process. To me, that is clear proof that the level deemed to be an acceptable risk by our automated underwriting systems is much too high. While many of these borrowers may ultimately be approved, it is because the manual process, or human underwriter, has analyzed non-traditional factors such as the borrower’s rent and utility payment history, which should be imbedded in the automated underwriting process.

Now, let me address my second issue, and that is the manual underwriting process itself. While Countrywide’s own internal evidence supports the notion that manual underwriters are approving a good majority of the loan applications that get referred, the fact of the matter remains that a human is involved in this step of the process thereby creating the possibility that a decision is made based upon the level of the borrower’s FICO score.

Thus, the current protocol intentionally creates an environment where borrowers with lower FICO scores are subject to being disproportionately affected by the manual underwriting process. I say we need to amend these systems to do more than just approve the "cream of the crop," by creating a system that says "no" only to those deemed unwilling to make their mortgage payments.

We must understand that the credit scoring system we have built is still imperfect, and that if we are to have any chance at closing the homeownership gap, we must make a serious investment in improving its capacity and capabilities. We must do this through improved automated underwriting models that take into account more variables, and measure true indicators of risk and willingness to pay. We need an ongoing educational process, not only at the primary market level, but also in the secondary markets and with mortgage insurers to help lead this effort to recalibrate the scoring system. And finally, it must be recognized that borrowers with credit scores below what is currently defined as "creditworthy" levels can still be acceptable credit risks. Thus, the credit score bar dividing creditworthy from high-risk borrowers, must be substantially lowered by the GSEs, the secondary market in general, and with bank regulators. The GSEs have made good progress over the last few years in expanding their credit criteria, but I encourage them to become much more aggressive in this regard.

What Angelo Mozilo desires to accomplish is to replace human underwriters with computers. He never mentions the Five Cs of credit because sound credit underwriting requires human judgment; which can be aided with, yet never replaced by, technology. In Mr. Mozilo’s daffy world of credit progressivism, he may as well distill the mortgage application down to a one-page document containing a single question: Are you willing to make your mortgage payment? If the answer is "yes" then the loan is approved and if the answer is "no" then it is declined. Under such circumstances, a computer would work perfectly.

As I have asserted before, political correctness is an enfeebling infection of the mind. Mr. Mozilo’s vision of politically-correct, and "enlightened," credit underwriting was nothing short of daffy. Yet, one can only imagine how approvingly this pabulum was met by his Harvard chums.

Angelo Mozilo had no intention of disappointing his fellow travelers. There was hope as to closing the homeownership gap. It was something called the subprime mortgage. In his bizarre mind, the more subprime mortgage originations there were, the better off America would be. To wit:

Historically low interest rates along with new, creative and flexible underwriting techniques are continuing to fuel a record period of growth for our industry. According to the Federal Reserve, the amount of overall mortgage debt outstanding is nearly $6 trillion. And, increasingly, the sub-prime market is boosting that number and the industry as a whole. During the first nine months of 2002, sub-prime originations rose an estimated 26 percent over the same period in 2001 – outpacing the overall market.

Had Mr. Mozilo delivered this speech today, he would have immediately been fitted into a straightjacket and then driven to the nearest loony bin.
Countrywide Financial and many other financial institutions ended up throwing all credit standards out the window in order to package and sell as many subprime mortgage-backed securities as possible. To be sure, many did not do so sharing Mozilo’s politically-correct and egalitarian hallucination – they just wanted to make a fast buck.

An important distinction to convey here pertains to the fact that Countrywide and others were not selling all of their loans to Freddie and Fannie. The aforementioned mortgage-backed securities were purely packaged and sold under private labels. When America’s housing bubble was expanding, buyers of such subprime securities obviously felt there was no downside. Such are the delusions that materialize when central bankers flood the world with the opiates of easy money and credit.

Regrettably, by completely ignoring underwriting fundamentals, Countrywide and its ilk have set up so many borrowers for failure (as have the king and queen of mortgage socialism, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae; both of whom, by the way, may be on the brink of their own financial meltdowns). The pain and anguish of losing a home, and having one’s family displaced, will be visited upon countless families. Of course, such borrowers must look in the mirror when the urge, to pass around the blame, emerges. Nonetheless, Angelo Mozilo’s dream has transmuted into a nightmare for millions.

My, oh my, aren’t political correctness, egalitarianism, and social engineering wonderful? You be the judge.

January 28, 2008
Eric Englund has an MBA from Boise State University and lives in the state of Oregon. He is the publisher of The Hyperinflation Survival Guide by Dr. Gerald Swanson. You are invited to visit his website.

The Crash of the Bank of United States

By Benjamin M. Anderson*

By the fourth quarter of 1930 the trouble with the Bank of United States gave occasion to grave concern.

The Bank of United States was a bank which ought never to have existed, and which certainly ought never to have had the name it had. One leading banker of New York went personally to Albany to protest against the giving of such a name to that bank or to any other bank, and was told that there was a political debt to pay.

In the period 1924 to 1929, with excess reserves and rapid bank expansion, it was easy for plungers and speculators to grow rapidly. There was a heavy discount on sound banking, and a high premium on reckless plunging. One watched it with apprehension, afraid not merely that bankers would lose their judgment but also that in many cases moral standards would crack. In many cases judgment went bad, and in more cases traditional practices, sound and tested, turned out to be bad practices in such an abnormal money markets as then existed. But the great majority of American bankers kept their integrity and tried to adhere to established and approved banking practices. However, it was an era in which the bold speculator and promoter could gain ground rapidly at the expense of the conservative banker, and it was a period in which departures from convention and approved banking practices would seem to be brilliant strokes of genius ― while the new era lasted.

The Bank of United States grew very rapidly down to 1929. The name itself meant, as it was designed to mean, to many of the ignorant people of Europe, that this was the national bank, the state bank, the official bank of the United States. Deposits came to it from a great many of those people and from a great many of the ignorant poor on the East Side of New York. And a great deal of business was brought to it, too, by men engaging in speculative activities who could get the desired accommodation from this bank which other banks of New York would not give.

Loans against mortgages were generally looked upon at askance by great New York banks. The first principle of commercial banking is to know “the difference between a bill of exchange and a mortgage”. Second mortgages and third mortgages were notoriously improper documents in a bank’s portfolio or as a collateral to its loans. But the Bank of United States went in heavily for these. It had an affiliate also ― the Bankus Corporation. This was engaged in many yet more questionable transactions, including manipulation of the stock of the bank and loans against the stock of the bank. In addition to the utterly unsound banking practices, there were definitely criminal acts for which the head of the bank subsequently went to prison ― not unaccompanied.

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